## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

-----181807Z 125928 /43

P R 181751Z APR 77 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2765 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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**EXDIS** 

AMBASSADOR PICKERING SENDS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR JO SY XF

SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE HASSAN'S DAMASCUS VISIT --

SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS

- 1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT ASSAD TOLD CROWN PRINCE HASSAN THAT HE FAVORS A UNITY PROCESS THAT PRESERVES SYRIAN AND JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY. FOR DOMESTIC AND INTER-ARAB REASONS, ASSAD PREFERS AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF SYRIAN-JORDANIAN UNITY PLANS. ARAFAT TOLD ASSAD THE SOVIETS WANT THE PLO AT GENEVA (WHEN AND HOW NOT CLEAR) AND THAT PLO MUST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. END SUMMARY
- 2. MORNING APRIL 17 CROWN PRINCE HASSAN PROVIDED ME WITH A BRIEFING ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO SYRIA. HE RAN OVER WITH ME THE NOTES ON HIS TALKS WHICH HE USED TO BRIEF KING HUSSEIN. HE SAW PRESIDENT ASSAD ALONE ON TWO OCCASIONS FOR SEVERAL HOURS EACH TIME. THIS CABLE COVERS MAJOR POINTS HE PASSED ON TO ME ON SYRIANJORDANIAN RELATIONS AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF AREA INTEREST. SOUTH LEBANON COVERED SEPTEL.

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3. PRESIDENT ASSAD, HASSAN CONCLUDED, WAS MORE FRANK WITH HIM IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAN WITH KHADDAM AND OTHERS PRESENT. HASSAN CONCLUDES FROM HIS VISIT THAT SYRIA IS A MAZE OF SEPARATE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS WHOSE INTERNAL COMMUNICATION IS DEPLORABLY BAD. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT ASSAD IS UNDER CONTINUING FINANCIAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE, BUT HE DID

## NOT GIVE ME DETAILS ON THESE POINTS.

- 4. ON SYRIAN-JORDANIAN UNITY, ASSAD TOLD HASSAN HE ACCEPTED KING HUSSEIN'S POINT THAT WHATEVER OCCURRED SHOULD NOT CAUSE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF EACH OF THE STATES. ASSAD SAID THAT THE TWO NEEDED TO DO SOMETHING MORE THAN AT PRESENT. THE END RESULT HAD TO BE SOMETHING GREATER THAN THE LIAISON BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM AND LESS THAN FULL UNITY. DOMESTIC PRESSURES AND INTER-ARAB REASONS, ASSAD CLAIMED, WERE STILL IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE UNITY TALKS JORDAN AND SYRIA WERE STILL SOMEWHAT ISOLATED IN THE ARAB WORLD. IF JORDAN DID NOT WANT TO GO AS FAR AS SYRIA DID, THAT FACT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO, ACCORDING TO ASSAD.
- 5. HASSAN SAID ASSAD CLEARLY WOULD LIKE AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITY TALKS TOGETHER WITH TIMETABLES.
- 6. HASSAN TOLD ASSAD THAT HE SAW THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP AS BASICALLY ONE BETWEEN THE ALAWITES AND THE HASHEMITES AND THAT THIS FACT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE TRUE FOR
  THE PROBLEMS HE HAD WITH SOME OF HIS DOMESTIC GROUPS IN
  CONTINUING THE UNITY PROCESS. HASSAN ALSO TOLD ASSAD
  THAT BOTH LEADERS HAD RECEIVED FROM THEIR ADVISORS A FORMULA FOR FUTURE UNITY (A CONFEDERATION PRESERVING BOTH
  SOVEREIGNTIES) AND THAT THIS FORMULA COULD BE ANNOUNCED
  AT ANY TIME BOTH LEADERS AGREED TO DO SO. ASSAD WAS
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FRANK IN HIS RECOGNITION THAT SAUDI ARABIA, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, EGYPT AND SOME OF THE OTHER ARABS ALL OPPOSED THE UNIFICATION EFFORTS FOR SEPARATE REASONS. ASSAD MADE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD HELP TO CRYSTALLIZE THE PROCESS TOWARD UNIFICATION IF A CONCRETE ANNOUNCEMENT WERE MADE AND IT MIGHT ALSO END THE UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION ON THE PART OF OTHERS.

- 7. HASSAN SAID HE SUGGESTED TO ASSAD THAT THE LEBANON ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH EFFORTS TOWARD UNITY AND THAT ASSAD CLEARLY GAVE IT SECOND PRIORITY.
- 8. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, ASSAD GAVE HASSAN A BRIEFING ON ARAFAT'S RECENT MOSCOW VISIT. ARAFAT WAS PLEASED BY THE

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

-----181809Z 126012 /43

P R 181751Z APR 77 FM AMEMBASSY LONDON TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2766 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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MADE TWO BASIC POINTS TO ARAFAT: (A) PLO SHOULD BE PRESENT AT GENEVA (HASSAN NOTED THAT REPORT DID NOT INDICATE THAT SOVIET SAID HOW OR WHEN THEY SHOULD BE PRESENT), AND (B) THAT PLO MUST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

9. ARAFAT ALSO REPORTED THAT SOVIETS ARE STILL EXTREME-LY NEGATIVE ON EGYPT AND SADAT, BUT SPOKE VERY POSITIVELY ABOUT SYRIA. IN CONTRAST, ARAFAT REPORTED HE WAS ASKED BY THE SOVIETS TO PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE BETWEEN THEM AND EGYPT IN AN EFFORT TO BRING THE TWO BACK TOGETHER. ARAFAT INDICATED HE DID NOT HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE IN EGYPT BUT WOULD TRY. ASSAD SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN ASKED BY EGYPT TO TALK ON ITS BEHALF WITH THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, HASSAN TOLD ME THAT MUBRAK, WHO VISITED AMMAN AFTER DAMASCUS AND AFTER HASSAN'S DEPARTURE FROM SYRIA, TOLD JORDANIANS THAT HE BROUGHT A REQUEST TO ASSAD TO ATTEMPT A MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE SOVIETS. ACCORDING TO THE EGYPTIANS, ASSAD AGREED TO DO THIS WHILE IN MOSCOW.

10. ASSAD IS STILL DISTURBED BY THE LACK OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE SAUDIS AND OTHER OIL STATES.

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11. ON THE RED SEA CONFERENCE, ASSAD SAID SADAT AND NUMEIRY BELIEVE THAT LIBYA CONTINUES TO POSE A DANGER

TO EGYPT AND THE SUDAN. THEY ARE NOW PARTICULARLY WORRIED THAT INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA WILL INCREASE THE THREAT. SYRIA BELIEVES IT IS BETTER TO HELP THE ERITREAN MOVEMENT NOW AND KEEP IT UNDER ARAB INFLUENCE RATHER THAN TO HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF MARXIST ETHIOPIANS AND THEIR SOVIET SUPPORTERS ENTIRELY DOMINATING THE AREA IN THE FUTURE.

**SPIERS** 

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## Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z

Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am Channel Indicators: n/a

**Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED** 

Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, DEBRIEFINGS, MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETING REPORTS

Control Number: n/a

Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 22 May 2009 Disposition Event:

Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977LONDON06268
Document Source: CORE

**Document Unique ID: 00** Drafter: n/a

Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS Errors: N/A

**Expiration:** 

Film Number: D770134-0315

Format: TEL From: LONDON **Handling Restrictions:** 

Image Path: ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770447/aaaabosz.tel

Line Count: 179 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History: Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

Message ID: 0b753aa3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Office: ACTION SS

Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS

Reference: n/a Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags: Review Date: 14-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am

Review Event:

Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:** Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

**SAS ID**: 2777004 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: CROWN PRINCE HASSAN\'S DAMASCUS VISIT -- SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS

TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, JO, SY, XF, (HASSAN, CROWN PRINCE)

To: STATE Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/0b753aa3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009